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A WATER STORY WITH ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION AND A DOCTRINE  
FOR CHANGING USES 
MELOSA GRANDA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a story of how two rivers in the remote reaches of Wyoming 
and Montana, and the underlying water, became a federal case before the 
United States Supreme Court. It is an account of a local water dispute 
whose resolution will likely impact the course of water law, and more 
importantly, water throughout the entire country. The story is common in 
the American West and around the world wherever the demand for water 
has surpassed the supply; perhaps this is a never-ending story. Yet the 
outcome was never predictable. The uncertainty was heightened by the 
fact that the dispute came to the Supreme Court without the benefit of 
any lower court’s analysis of the issues raised. There were also matters 
of first impression; the possibilities for interpreting longstanding 
doctrines to determine the legality of new ways of using water and new 
water uses seemed wide open. In the chronicle that follows, the authors 
present their assessments of the conflict, the outcomes thus far, and the 
opportunities to continue developing the story. There are morals of the 
story too; there are recommendations for wiser regulation and clearer 
articulation of applicable legal doctrines. These Articles impart a sober 
warning that without the Supreme Court’s timely guidance, the most 
important natural resource, water, could suffer grave and irreversible 
consequences. 
Long before the dispute became important, the actors involved—
Montana and Wyoming—signed an agreement with each other and with 
* J.D. 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law. The author would like to thank her editors, 
Luthien Niland and Sofiya Feerer, and Professors Mudd and MacDonnell for their guidance and 
thoughtful suggestions. 
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North Dakota that allocated the rights to use the waters of their interstate 
rivers.1 They hoped that the 1950 Yellowstone River Compact would 
“remove all causes of present and future controversy.”2 Perhaps the 
relatively uneventful course of agricultural “business as usual” in the 
Yellowstone Basin can be attributed to a plentiful water supply that 
never before compelled a need for judicial enforcement of the Compact’s 
terms.3 But in 2007, the very instrument that sought to avoid conflict, the 
Compact, became the subject of conflict when Montana accused 
Wyoming of violating the Compact’s terms. Montana’s allegations were 
fourfold: Wyoming misappropriated water by increasing its irrigation 
efficiency and therefore increasing its water consumption; Wyoming’s 
groundwater withdrawals in connection with coalbed methane mining 
were illegal; Wyoming impermissibly built new water storage facilities; 
and Wyoming’s irrigation of new acreage was prohibited.4 Unsatisfied 
with Wyoming’s denial of any wrongdoing, Montana filed an action 
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court accepted the 
case.5 To assist in the proceeding, the Court appointed a Special Master 
who reviewed the facts surrounding the dispute, analyzed applicable 
laws, and made recommendations to the Court. The rest is history in the 
making, as discussed in the Articles that follow.6 Specifically, the 
authors focus on Montana’s first two allegations regarding irrigation 
efficiency and coalbed methane water withdrawals. But first, it is worth 
reviewing some legal background behind the Supreme Court’s unique 
handling of interstate water disputes 
 1 See Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951). 
 2 Id.; see also Michelle Bryan Mudd, Montana v. Wyoming: An Opportunity to Right the 
Course for Coalbed Methane Development and Prior Appropriation, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 297 (2012). 
 3 See, e.g., YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT COMMISSION, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 1 
(1964), available at yrcc.usgs.gov/support.docs/YRCCAnnualReport1964b.pdf  (“No matters of 
allocation came to the Commission’s attention during the year. The two state representatives were of 
the opinion that no determination of allocation of water between Wyoming and Montana was 
necessary.”); YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT COMMISSION, TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT III 
(1980), available at yrcc.usgs.gov/support.docs/YRCCAnnualReport1980.pdf (“No incidents during 
the year required administration of the water in accordance with the provisions of the Compact.”). 
 4 Montana Bill of Complaint at 3, ¶¶ 8–11, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) 
(No. 137, Orig.); see also Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Montana v. Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation 
Water Use Efficiency, and the Doctrine of Recapture, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 265 (2011). 
 5 Montana v. Wyoming, 552 U.S. 1175 (2008) (granting Montana leave to file its 
complaint). 
 6 See MacDonnell, supra note 4; Mudd, supra note 2. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
While the Supreme Court most often serves as the final appellate 
decision maker in reviewing a lower court’s decision, under Article III of 
the Constitution the Supreme Court also has original jurisdiction “in all 
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and 
those in which a State shall be Party.”7 In an action between states, the 
Court’s original jurisdiction is exclusive.8 Thus, a complaining state in 
an original action must bring its grievance directly to the Supreme Court, 
demonstrating satisfaction of a heightened standard for substantial 
injury.9 Should the Court, with its discretionary powers to decline any 
case for review,10 accept the case under its original jurisdiction, it must 
function as both a trial and an appellate court.11 In so doing, the Supreme 
Court initially hears the case, reviewing the evidence for the first time, 
and renders final decisions that are not subject to review by any higher 
court.12 
To remedy the unprepared and unprocessed state in which an 
original jurisdiction case arrives at the Supreme Court, a special master is 
often appointed.13 The special master may be a retired judge or an 
individual who is an expert in the field from which the dispute arises.14 
The special master helps gather and present facts, formulates analyses of 
how relevant laws apply to the facts, and recommends decisions for the 
Court’s consideration.15 These tasks may be challenging, especially 
when legal conclusions depend on a mastery of the specific and complex 
facts at hand; such is the case with disputes involving water rights.16 It is 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 8 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.”). 
 9 17 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4054 (3d ed. 
2011) (“The initial pleading must be accompanied by a motion for leave to file, which may be 
accompanied by a brief. . . . If leave to file is granted, additional pleadings and subsequent 
proceedings are ordered by direction of the Court.”); Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable 
Apportionment Revisited, Updated and Restated, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 381 391 1984-1985. 
 10 Id. § 4042. 
 11 Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in 
the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 656 (2002) (“The 
delegation of trial tasks to a Special Master, followed by review by the Supreme Court, allows the 
Court to operate facilely in the manner in which it is most accustomed—that of an appellate court 
scrutinizing the facts and conclusions of an inferior actor or body.”). 
 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Carstens, supra note 11, at 648. 
 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9; Carstens, supra note 11, at 654. 
 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4042; Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, 
The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology and Law of Stream/Aquifer Interactions, 43 ROCKY MTN. 
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the Court’s ultimate responsibility to affirm, reject, or modify the special 
master’s recommendations.17 
The Supreme Court seldom exercises its discretion to resolve a 
dispute under its original jurisdiction,18 but it has done so for a number 
of cases involving the apportionment of interstate waters.19 Traditionally, 
interstate water disputes are resolved not only through litigation, but also 
through interstate compacts and, on rare occasions, federal legislation.20 
But when the latter two methods have not been applied or do not 
sufficiently address the dispute, or when the parties have competing 
interpretations of some terms or provisions, the Supreme Court accepts 
interstate water disputes with relative ease.21 Still, the Court will exercise 
its original jurisdiction over such disputes only if they are sufficiently 
severe. 
In petitioning the Supreme Court for adjudication of an interstate 
water dispute, normally a state must show by “clear and convincing” 
evidence that the dispute is of a “serious magnitude.”22 If a water 
MIN. L. INST. 22, § 22.01 (1997) (“Water law traditionally involves state issues that are quite fact 
specific and nuanced.”). 
 17 Carstens, supra note 11, at 655 (“Once the Special Master’s report is transmitted to the 
Court, the Court exercises its authority in reviewing the report and revising or approving the 
Master’s findings, conclusions, or recommendations in whole or in part.”); see Colorado v. New 
Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984) (a “Master’s findings . . . deserve respect and a tacit presumption 
of correctness”). 
 18 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4042. In the 2009-2010 Term, the Court issued a 
decision in two original actions; in 2008-2009 it issued a decision in one original action; in 2006-
2007 it did not dispose of a single original action. See id. 
 19 See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (exercising original 
jurisdiction over action to compel equitable apportionment of waters of an interstate stream); 
Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221 (1991) (adjudicating a dispute over an interstate water 
compact); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 567–68 (1983) (holding that the Court had original 
jurisdiction to enforce the Pecos River Compact); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963) 
(noting that the Court “does have a serious responsibility to adjudicate cases where there are actual 
existing controversies over how interstate streams should be apportioned among States”); New 
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (“A river is more than an amenity, it is a 
treasure. It offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have power over it.”); 
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145 (1902) (exercising original jurisdiction over suit to enjoin 
Colorado from diverting the Arkansas River). 
 20 John B. Draper & Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Gunboats on the Colorado: Interstate Water 
Controversies, Past and Present, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, § 18.03 (2009). 
 21 See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1773 n.5 (2011) (“Our original 
jurisdiction over cases between States brings us this dispute between Montana and Wyoming about 
the meaning of their congressionally approved Yellowstone River Compact.”). 
 22 New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) (“Before this court can be moved to 
exercise its extraordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one state at the suit 
of another, the threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established 
by clear and convincing evidence.”); see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 188 (1982); 
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compact or federal legislation does not provide the controlling law to be 
applied, the Court applies a set of federal common law rules, or rather 
principles of equitable apportionment.23 In so doing, the Court balances 
equities between the states.24 This analysis includes a review of past 
judicial decisions and each state’s water laws; other considerations are as 
varied as physical and climatic conditions, water consumption, stream 
flows, established use, harms and benefits, and water conservation.25 If a 
water compact does exist and is deemed sufficient to address a particular 
interstate water dispute, the Court looks directly to the terms of the 
compact.26 A compact is not only an interstate agreement for defining 
states’ rights to divert and use the waters within their borders; it is a 
contract between states approved by Congress and embodied in a federal 
statute.27 Negotiators of an interstate compact establish the compact’s 
terms to serve the needs of the parties, and in so doing may incorporate 
preexisting doctrines of common law.28 In these instances, looking 
directly to the terms of the compact is not enough. The Yellowstone 
River Compact is an example of such a compact, as it expressly adopted 
principles of prior appropriation law.29 A basic understanding of prior 
appropriation law is necessary, therefore, to appreciate Montana’s 
complaint against Wyoming, the Special Master’s recommendations, and 
the Supreme Court decision. 
In the 1800s, western states rejected the then- and now-predominant 
system in the United States for allocating water rights.30 For the western 
states, the riparian water rights system, in which landowners have the 
right to reasonably use any bodies of water adjoining their lands, was too 
limiting on their ability to withdrawal water, especially for uses on non-
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931). 
 23 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4052; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907) 
(referring to the applicable law in the first disposition of an interstate water apportionment case as 
“interstate common law”). 
 24 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4052. 
 25 Id.; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931) (“The different traditions and 
practices in different parts of the country may lead to varying results, but the effort always is to 
secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas.”). 
 26 See Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 690 (1995) (“[U]nless the compact to which 
Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with its 
express terms.”) (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983)). 
 27 See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.01 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011). The first 
interstate water compact was approved by Congress in 1925. There are currently twenty-three 
interstate water compacts. Id. 
 28 See, e.g., Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231 art. V, 65 Stat. 663 (1951). 
 29 Id. art. I. 
 30 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 11.01 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
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adjoining lands.31 The system of prior appropriation was thought more 
suited to the water scarce lands of the West, and that system developed 
under the common law of each separate state.32 Variations in the prior-
appropriation doctrine from state to state existed then and persist today, 
as prior-appropriation law has become largely statutory.33 Still, some 
general principles apply across states. 
The doctrine of prior appropriation is often expressed as “first in 
time, first in right.”34 This means that a person in time who appropriates 
some water for a beneficial use has the right to continued use for that 
purpose, with priority over later appropriators.35 A water user with an 
earlier priority date can compel a user with a later priority date to refrain 
from use until the senior user has fulfilled her water needs for her 
established purpose.36 Still, the senior user’s rights are not unlimited. A 
beneficial use is commonly defined as agriculture, industrial, ecological, 
or household; however, waste is excluded.37 All water users are also 
under the obligation not to harm other users’ water supplies by changing 
their points of diversion, purposes, or places of water use.38 Water 
appropriators can require each other to use water strictly within the 
confines of their rights.”39 Yet even when the confines are legally clear, 
the practical application of one’s rights can lead to water disputes of 
 31 Id. Eighteen states now follow the prior appropriation system; some of those states include 
groundwater to varying degrees. Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.02 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
 35 See CHARLES J. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 4 (1971) ( “A property right in the use of water is created by diversion of 
the water from a stream (or lake) and its application to a beneficial use. Water can be used at any 
location, without regard to the position of place of use in relation to the stream. In the event of a 
shortage of supply, water will be supplied up to a limit of the right in order of temporal priority: the 
last man to divert and make use of the stream is the first to have his supply cut off.”), quoted in 2 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.01 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
 36 See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 12.01, 12.02 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
 37 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(4) (Westlaw 2011) (defining beneficial use); see 
also Frank Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12 
Wyo. L. J. 1, 16 (1957) (“In rather recent times these concepts have been merged into a new rule—
that a particular use must not only be embraced within the general class of uses held to be beneficial, 
or must not only be of benefit to the appropriator but it must also be a reasonable and economic use 
of the water in view of other present and future demands upon the source of supply.”); Janet C. 
Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western 
Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 921 n.1 (“Though the codes differed in coverage and detail, all of 
them incorporated certain basic concepts, including beneficial use as the basis of a water right . . . 
and prohibitions against waste.”). 
 38 See MacDonnell, supra note 4, at 274 (referring to the “no-injury rule”). 
 39 Id. 
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great significance. 
And so the story goes. With original jurisdiction over the Montana 
and Wyoming’s interstate water dispute, the Supreme Court and its 
Special Master looked to the Yellowstone River Compact. They applied 
principles of prior appropriation law and rendered their conclusions. An 
evaluation of those conclusions and recommendations for further 
conclusions is now in order. 
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